We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player n) does not. Two strategic variables are t i 's and s i 's for each player i. Mainly we will show the following results. 1) The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose t i 's and Player n chooses s n as their strategic variables. 2) The equilibrium when all players choose s i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose s i 's and Player n chooses t n as their strategic variables. The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's and the equilibrium when all players choose s i 's are not equivalent although they are equivalent in a symmetric game in which all players have the same payoff functions.
Introduction
We consider a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two strategic variables are t i and s i for each player i. They are related by invertible functions. The game is symmetric for all but one player in the sense that they have the same payoff functions. On the other hand, one player (Player n) may have a different payoff function. Thus, the game is partially asymmetric; or there is only one alien. In Section 3 we will show the following main results.
1. The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose t i 's and Player n chooses s n as their strategic variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose s i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose s i 's and Player n chooses t n as their strategic variables.
An example of multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables is a relative profit maximization game in an oligopoly with differentiated goods. See Section 4. In that section we will show;
1. The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose t i 's and one player other than Player n chooses s i as their strategic variables.
2. The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose s i 's and Player n chooses t n as their strategic variables.
3. The equilibrium when all players choose s i 's is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose s i 's and one player other than Player n chooses t i as their strategic variables.
4. The equilibrium when all players choose s i 's is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all but one players choose t i 's and Player n chooses s n as their strategic variables.
5. The equilibrium when all players choose t i 's is not equivalent to the equilibrium when all players s i 's.
In these results t i 's are the outputs and s i 's are the prices. In a symmetric game they are all equivalent1. In Section 4 we also show that with more than one aliens the equivalence result does not hold.
In the next section we present a model of this paper and prove a preliminary result which is a variation of Sion's minimax theorem.
The model and the minimax theorem
We consider a multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are n players, n ≥ 3. Two strategic variables are t i 's and s i 's, i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We denote N = {1, . . ., n}. The game is symmetric for Players 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 in the sense that they have the same payoff functions. On the other hand, Player n may have a different payoff function.
t i is chosen from T i and s i is chosen from S i . T i and S i are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces, respectively, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The relations of the strategic variables are represented by s i = f i (t 1 , . . . , t n ), i ∈ N,
f i (t 1 , . . ., t n ) and g i (s 1 , . . . , s n ) are continuous, invertible, one-to-one and onto functions. We assume that all T i 's are identical, and all S i 's are identical. Denote them by T and S. When only Player n chooses s n , then t n is determined according to
We denote this t n by t n (t 1 , . . ., t n−1 , s n ). When all players choose s i 's, i ∈ N, then t i 's for them are determined according to
Denote these t i 's by t i (s 1 , . . . , s n ). The payoff function of Player i is u i , i ∈ N. It is written as
We assume
It is quasi-concave on T i and S i for a strategy of each other player, and quasi-convex on T j , j i and S j , j i for each t i and s i .
We do not postulate differentiability of the payoff functions. Symmetry of the game for Players 1, 2, . . . , n−1 means that these players are interchangeable in the payoff function of each player. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values of the payoff functions of the players is zero.
Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) for a continuous function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological spaces, and let f : X × Y → R be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable, then
We follow the description of Sion's theorem in Kindler (2005) . Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper such that Player n may choose s n and the other players choose t i 's as their strategic variables, we have the following relations.
where t k is a vector of t k , k i, n, of the players other than Players i and n who choose t k 's as their strategic variables. u i (t i , t n , t k ) is the payoff of Player i when Players i and n choose t i and t n . On the other hand, u i (t i , t n (t i , s n , t k ), t k ) means the payoff of Player i when he chooses t i and Player n chooses s n .
We show the following results.
, and fix the value of t n at
where f k denotes a vector of the values of s k 's of players who choose t k 's. We have
where max t i ∈T u i (t i , t 0 n , t k ) is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given the value of t n at t 0 n . We assume thatt i (s n ) = arg max t i ∈T u i (t i , t n (t i , s n , t k ), t k ) is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u i ,t i (s n ) is continuous, then any value of t 0 n can be realized by appropriately choosing s n according to (1) . Therefore,
On the other hand, max t i ∈T u i (t i , t n , t k ) is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given t n . Let t i (t n ) = arg max t i ∈T u i (t i , t n , t k ), and fix the value of s n at
We have
where max t i ∈T u i (t i , t n (t i , s 0 n , t k ), t k ) is the maximum of u i with respect to t i given the value of s n at s 0 n . We assume thatt i (t n ) = arg max t i ∈T u i (t i , t n , t k ) is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of u i ,t i (t n ) is continuous, then any value of s 0 n can be realized by appropriately choosing t n according to (3). Therefore, min s n ∈S max
The main results
In this section we present the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1.
The equilibrium where all players choose t i 's is equivalent to the equilibrium when one player (Player n) chooses s n and all other players choose t i 's as their strategic variables.
Proof.
1. Consider a situation (t 1 , . . ., t n−1 , t n ) = (t, . . ., t, t n ). By symmetry for Players 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 max t i ∈T u i (t, . . ., t i , . . ., t, t n ) = max t j ∈T u j (t, . . ., t j , . . ., t, t n ), for any i, j n, and arg max t i ∈T u i (t, . . ., t i , . . ., t, t n ) = arg max t j ∈T u j (t, . . ., t j , . . . , t, t n ) ∈ T, for any i, j n, given t n .
Let
t n (t) = arg max t n ∈T u n (t, . . ., t, t n ).
We assume that it is a single-valued continuous function.
Consider the following function.
This function is continuous and T is compact. Thus, there exists a fixed point given t n . Denote it by t * (t n ), then
. . , t * (t n ), t n ), for any i n, given t n .
Now we consider the following function. t → t * (t n (t)).
This also has a fixed point. Denote it by t * and t n (t * ) by t * n , then we have
, . . ., t * , t * n ), for any i n, and max
(t 1 , . . ., t n−1 , t n ) = (t * , . . . , t * , t * n ) is a Nash equilibrium when all players choose t i 's as their strategic variables.
2. Because the game is zero-sum,
By symmetry for Players 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, 
(5) and (6) mean
= min
Thus, arg min
By (7) min
Therefore, arg max
This holds for any player i n.
On the other hand, because any value of s n is realized by appropriately choosing t n ,
From (8) and (9), (t * , . . . , t * , t n (t * , . . ., t * , s 0 n (t * ))) is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to (t * , . . . , t * , t * n ). 
Various examples
Consider a game of relative profit maximization under oligopoly including four firms with differentiated goods2. It is a four-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. The firms are A, B, C and D. The strategic variables are the outputs and the prices of their goods. We consider the following four patterns of competition.
The absolute profits of the firms are 
The firms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the relative profits. We see ϕ A + ϕ B + ϕ C + ϕ D = 0, so the game is zero-sum. We assume c A = c B = c C , that is, the game is symmetric for Firms A, B and C. However, c D is not equal to c A . Thus, the game is partially asymmetric. Firm D is an alien.
We calculate the equilibrium outputs of the firms in the above four patterns.
,
Pattern 2
3. Pattern 3 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined equilibria in a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game. We have shown that in an asymmetric zero-sum game with only one alien (a player who has a different payoff function) we get the equivalence result about the choice of strategic variables.
